信危機及我國壽險市場(chǎng)逆向選擇問(wèn)題的思考

畢業(yè)論文

信危機及我國壽險市場(chǎng)逆向選擇問(wèn)題的思考
 
摘 要：在信息經(jīng)濟學(xué)發(fā)展成為當代主流經(jīng)濟學(xué)重要組成部分的背景下，針對我國壽險市場(chǎng)中大量存在的壽險公司與投保方之間嚴重的信息不對稱(chēng)問(wèn)題，本文著(zhù)重從微觀(guān)信息經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論層面對我國壽險市場(chǎng)的逆向選擇問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究。
本文論述了我國壽險市場(chǎng)上逆向選擇產(chǎn)生的原因及其造成的不良后果，充分證明了我國保險業(yè)界解決信息不對稱(chēng)問(wèn)題和防范誠信危機的重要性和緊迫性。通過(guò)構造保險市場(chǎng)囚徒困境博弈模型，并對各種可能促使保險雙方合作的機制進(jìn)行比較，本文得出激勵機制是緩解信息不對稱(chēng)并有效解決我國保險市場(chǎng)囚徒困境的最優(yōu)戰略。本文對Rothschild-Stiglitz信息甄別模型進(jìn)行了評述和借鑒，它構成本文針對我國壽險市場(chǎng)逆向選擇問(wèn)題提出的各項對策建議的理論基礎。從對信息甄別模型的分析和結論中，本文得到啟示：當壽險公司無(wú)法有效區分不同風(fēng)險類(lèi)別的投保人時(shí)，它可以在保險合同中設計1系列不同保障數額對應不同保費的保單組合供投保人自行選擇，然后通過(guò)觀(guān)察投保人的選擇來(lái)對他們的風(fēng)險信息進(jìn)行甄別。最后，本文提出4種用以解決我國壽險市場(chǎng)逆向選擇問(wèn)題的對策建議，包括: 設計相應的保險契約條款、加快建立保險企業(yè)信用評級制度、保險代理人激勵機制和建立完善保險信息披露制度，并給出了具體的實(shí)施方案和修正意見(jiàn)。

關(guān)鍵詞: 信息不對稱(chēng)；信息甄別；囚徒困境；保險企業(yè)信用評級

Comments on the Good Faith Crisis and the Reflection of the Adverse Selection Problems in Domestic Insurance Market
 
Abstract：Facing the development of information economics as an important part of modern economics and serious asymmetric information between our insurer and insured, the paper studies solutions to these asymmetric information problems in our insurance market from information microeconomics. The paper discusses causes and disadvantageous results of the insureds adverse selection in our insurance market respectively. It proves that solving our asymmetric information problems is very important and urgent. Then the paper constructs a prisoners dilemma model in insurance market and compares several mechanisms likely propelling cooperation between both insurance sides, which draws a conclusion that the incentive mechanism is the best strategy to alleviate information asymmetry and solve the prisoners dilemma in our insurance market. The paper describes and comments on the Rothschild-Stiglitz screening model of the partial equilibrium. It constitutes the papers theoretic problems in our insurance market. Through these analysis and conclusions of the models, the paper receives the revelation: When the life insurance company is unable the policy holder which effectively differentiates the different risk category, it may design series of different safe guards amount correspondence different insurance premium in the insurance contract the chit combination voluntarily to choose for the policy holder, then through observes policy holders choice to carry on to their risk information screens. In the end, the paper puts forward four methods to resolve the adverse selection problems in our insurance market, which include designing the corresponding insurance contract provision, Speeding up the establishment insurance enterprise credit rating system, the safe agent drove the mechanism and establishing the consummates insurance information to disclose the system. In the end, it eventually has produced the concrete implementation plan and the revision opinion.

Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Partial Equilibrium; Prisoners Dilemma; Insurance Enterprise Credit Rating System

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